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SAVING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
 
Paul R. Gugliuzza* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Is it time to abolish the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over 
patent cases? In the thought-provoking speech at the center of this symposium, 
Judge Diane Wood says yes.1 The Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction, she 
argues, provides too much legal uniformity, which harms the patent system.2 But 
rather than eliminating the court altogether, Judge Wood proposes to save the 
Federal Circuit by letting appellants in patent cases choose the forum, allowing 
them to appeal either to the Federal Circuit or to the regional circuit 
encompassing the district court.3  
Judge Wood is in good company arguing that the Federal Circuit’s 
exclusive jurisdiction should be eliminated. In their pioneering article, 
Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, Professors Craig Nard and John 
Duffy proposed to replace the court’s exclusive jurisdiction with a model of 
“polycentric decision making” under which two or three courts would hear 
patent appeals, permitting inter-court dialogue and enhancing the possibility for 
self-correction.4 Judge Wood’s colleague on the Seventh Circuit, Judge Richard 
Posner, also has recently said that he “[doesn’t] think the Federal Circuit has 
  
 * Copyright © 2014 Paul R. Gugliuzza. Associate Professor, Boston University 
School of Law. For comments, thanks to Jonas Anderson, Jack Beermann, Jonathan 
Darrow, Stacey Dogan, Wendy Gordon, Tim Holbrook, Megan La Belle, Mark Lemley, 
Mike Meurer, Michael Morley, Rachel Rebouché, David Schwartz, David Walker, and 
students and faculty at the Boston University School of Law IP Workshop. Thanks also 
to the Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property for the opportunity to respond to 
Judge Wood’s remarks. 
 1 Hon. Diane P. Wood, Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s Exclusive 
Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2013). 
 2 Id. at 4–5. 
 3 Id. at 9–10. 
 4 Craig A. Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 
NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1664 (2007). 
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been a success” and that he would “return patent appellate responsibility to the 
regional circuits, where it was before 1982.”5 
Abolishing the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction may well improve 
patent law. The Federal Circuit’s patent doctrine has been criticized as “isolated 
and sterile” and “disconnected from the technological communities affected by 
patent law.”6 Exclusive jurisdiction may also make the court too responsive to 
the desires of the patent bar.7 However, two premises underlie Judge Wood’s 
claim that the legal uniformity provided by exclusive Federal Circuit jurisdiction 
harms the patent system, and in this paper I seek to highlight—and question—
those premises.  
The first premise is that the Federal Circuit actually provides legal 
uniformity. Judge Wood suggests that, due to the Federal Circuit’s exclusive 
jurisdiction, patent doctrine is insufficiently “percolated,” meaning that it lacks 
mechanisms through which case law can be critiqued, reexamined, tested, and 
corrected, and issues worthy of Supreme Court review can be flagged.8 Yet 
percolating forces do exist in the patent system. For example, in the Federal 
Circuit, dissents critiquing existing doctrine are frequent and often lead to en 
banc proceedings reexamining and sometimes correcting the doctrine at issue. In 
addition, the Supreme Court, federal district courts, Congress, the Solicitor 
  
 5 David Haas et al., An Interview with Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner: Part I, 
LAW360 (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/485352/an-interview-with-
7th-circ-judge-richard-posner-part-1. For another critique of exclusive Federal Circuit 
jurisdiction, see JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 230 (2008) (arguing that the 
Federal Circuit’s “poor response to new technologies,” particularly in the fields of 
software and biotechnology, “suggests that a single, centralized appeals court is not an 
effective institutional arrangement”). 
 6 Nard & Duffy, supra note 4, at 1620–21. 
 7 See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1791, 1854–56 (2013). See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR 
AUDIENCES 97–99 (2006) (suggesting that judges who serve on specialized courts “are 
likely to orient themselves toward the legal fields on which they concentrate and toward 
the lawyers in those fields”). 
 8 Wood, supra note 1, at 4. For a summary of the perceived benefits of doctrinal 
percolation, see Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the 
Supreme Court’s Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 699 n.68 
(1984) (“The percolation process has four principal benefits: (1) it encourages the courts 
of appeals to examine and criticize each other’s decisions . . . ; (2) it often provides the 
Supreme Court with a number of independent analyses of legal issues . . . ; (3) it permits 
the courts of appeals to experiment with different legal rules, which can provide the 
Supreme Court with concrete information about the consequences of various options; and 
(4) it can allow the circuit courts to resolve conflicts by themselves, without Supreme 
Court intervention.”). For a contrary view about the normative desirability of percolation, 
see Paul M. Bator, What Is Wrong with the Supreme Court?, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 
689–91 (1990). 
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General, and the Patent and Trademark Office, among others, all provide, 
through various channels, diverse and influential perspectives that prevent patent 
law from becoming stale.9  
The second premise underlying Judge Wood’s argument is that a lack of 
dialogue among the federal appellate courts causes problems in patent law. 
Problematic Federal Circuit doctrine, however, should not be blamed solely on a 
lack of dialogue among peer-level courts. For one, as I have just mentioned, 
there are substitutes for that dialogue in the current institutional design. 
Moreover, several Federal Circuit doctrines that have been overturned by the 
Supreme Court or criticized by scholars and judges seem heavily influenced by 
the charges Congress gave the Federal Circuit upon its creation: to provide 
uniformity and expertise in patent matters and to strengthen patent rights.10 For 
example, de novo appellate review of patent claim construction arguably 
illustrates a court seeking, perhaps overzealously, to pursue uniformity and to 
provide its expert input on the most important question in any patent case. 
Thus, normative proposals about the structure of the Federal Circuit 
should not focus entirely on introducing percolation; they should also consider 
ways to reduce the influence of the policies for which the Federal Circuit was 
created.11 Importantly, there may be ways to reduce that influence while also 
saving the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases. For 
example, the President could appoint to the court more individuals who have 
some knowledge of patent law but also have experience in many other areas of 
law. The jurisprudence of the first-ever former district judge appointed to the 
Federal Circuit, Judge Kathleen O’Malley, suggests that judges with such wide-
ranging experience might be inclined to oppose doctrines that blindly pursue 
patent-specific policy objectives at the cost of broader goals, such as litigation 
efficiency and maintaining the consistency of patent law with other areas of 
federal law. 
I. PERCOLATION IN PATENT LAW 
Although patent law under the Federal Circuit is more uniform than if 
patent cases were decided by twelve different regional circuits, there are forces 
in the patent system that resemble the percolation Judge Wood hopes would 
occur in a pluralistic regime.12 Judges at all levels of the federal judiciary, as 
  
 9 See infra Part I. 
 10 See infra Part II. 
 11 See infra Part III. 
 12 For recent commentary challenging the assumption that patent law under the 
Federal Circuit is uniform, see Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Percolation, Uniformity, and 
Coherent Adjudication: The Federal Circuit Experience, 66 SMU L. REV. 505, 519 
(2013), and Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 1161, 1165–71 (2010). 
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well as organizations within the executive branch, “elaborat[e] . . . competing 
viewpoints” on important questions of patent law; those competing viewpoints 
“present the Supreme Court,” which is paying increased attention to patent 
cases, “with a clearer picture of the [legal] landscape”; and courts—particularly 
the Federal Circuit—make “[m]istakes” that have the potential to “teach 
valuable lessons.”13 
A theory in the law and economics literature posits that the common law 
evolved toward an efficient set of rules because disputes involving inefficient 
rules settled less often than disputes involving efficient rules.14 As a result, 
inefficient rules would be overturned more frequently in litigation.15 Drawing on 
that theory, one danger of having appellate patent jurisdiction centralized in the 
Federal Circuit is that the prior-panel rule (under which three-judge appellate 
panels are bound to follow precedential decisions of prior three-judge panels) 
discourages litigants from challenging inefficient rules of patent law and makes 
it more difficult for the court to overturn those rules. For example, Professors 
Nard and Duffy quote Judge Randall Rader, who recently resigned as chief 
judge of the Federal Circuit, as stating that the court has “retarded the pace of 
common law development in some important ways.”16 They also quote Judge 
Rader’s immediate predecessor as chief judge, Judge Paul Michel, as stating that 
the court “keep[s] replicating . . . old results based on . . . old precedents” 
because litigants simply “echo” what the court has written in prior opinions.17 
Yet the prior-panel rule does not keep Federal Circuit doctrine set in 
stone. In fact, exclusive appellate jurisdiction might hasten the evolution of 
patent law as compared to a regime in which patent appeals were dispersed 
among the regional circuits. The Federal Circuit decides over two hundred 
patent cases per year on the merits and issues over one hundred precedential 
patent opinions annually.18 In fact, Judge Rader, in the speech quoted by 
Professors Nard and Duffy, compared the Federal Circuit’s large docket of 
patent cases to the small dockets of copyright and trademark cases decided by 
  
 13 Wood, supra note 1, at 4–5. 
 14 See Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 61 
(1977). 
 15 See id. 
 16 Nard & Duffy, supra note 4, at 1622 (quoting Judge Randall R. Rader, The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: The Promise and Perils of a Court of 
Limited Jurisdiction, 5 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001)). 
 17 Id. (quoting Judge Paul R. Michel, Keynote Presentation, Berkeley Center for Law 
& Technology Conference on Patent System Reform (Mar. 1, 2002)). 
 18 See Jason Rantanen, Federal Circuit Dispositions, Part I, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 14, 
2011), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/02/federal-circuit-dispostions-part-i.html 
(providing data from 2010). Unfortunately, in 2011, the Federal Circuit stopped 
compiling this useful caseload data. See Jason Rantanen, Federal Circuit Statistics—FY 
2011, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/10/federal-
circuit-statistics-fy-2011.html. 
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each regional circuit and concluded that the Federal Circuit had in some ways 
“dramatically accelerated the pace of common law development.”19 
Examples of rapid reexamination and fluctuation in Federal Circuit patent 
doctrine abound. In the past six years alone, the court has convened en banc to 
reconsider fundamental questions including: the standard of review for claim 
construction,20 the patent eligibility of business methods21 and computer 
software,22 and the standard for inequitable conduct before the Patent and 
Trademark Office,23 among many others.24 
In fact, it might be that judges who specialize in a particular area of law, 
such as the judges of the Federal Circuit, are better positioned to evolve that 
area of law than generalist judges on multiple courts would be. Specialized 
judges might be more attentive to important issues in the field and more likely to 
notice an issue that is ripe for reconsideration. The Federal Circuit facilitates this 
close attention by circulating all precedential opinions to the entire court for 
review, comment, and potential sua sponte en banc action before issuance.25 
Moreover, centralization of patent appeals in the Federal Circuit makes it easier 
for amici to track and alert the judges to cases worthy of en banc review. A 
study by Colleen Chien provides evidence of the important role amici play in 
spurring the Federal Circuit to reexamine particular issues, reporting that the 
court grants twelve percent of en banc petitions accompanied by amicus briefs, 
compared to less than two percent of petitions without amicus briefing.26 Such 
  
 19 Rader, supra note 16, at 4 (emphasis added). 
 20 Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
 21 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 22 CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir.) (en banc), aff’d, No. 13-
298, 2014 WL 2765283 (U.S. 2014). 
 23 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en 
banc). 
 24 See Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en 
banc) (finality of judgments in patent cases for the purpose of appeal); Akamai Techs., 
Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (standard for 
inducing patent infringement), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014); TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar 
Corp., 646 F.3d 869 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (standard for infringement by products 
redesigned after a finding of infringement); Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (standard for patent misuse); Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (whether the written description 
requirement is an independent element of patentability); Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, 
Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (standard for infringing a design patent). 
 25 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, INTERNAL OPERATING 
PROCEDURE No. 10-5 (July 7, 2010). 
 26 Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends Can Teach Us 
About the Patent System, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 397, 424 (2011). Professor Chien also 
reports that six percent of Federal Circuit petitions for rehearing en banc are accompanied 
by amicus briefs. Id. at 426. 
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close attention to one area of law by both judges and amici seems much less 
likely to occur in the regional circuits. 
In addition, many if not most of the Federal Circuit’s recent en banc 
rehearings were presaged by panel dissents or concurrences, or dissents from the 
denial of rehearing en banc in other cases raising the same issue.27 These 
separate opinions provide a forum for the court’s judges to criticize their 
colleagues’ decisions and to propose alternative analyses of relevant legal 
issues—two of the key functions of “percolation” as envisioned by Judge 
Wood.28 Several Federal Circuit judges, for example, expressed dissatisfaction 
with de novo appellate review of claim construction before the court granted 
rehearing on that issue in March 2013.29  
Sometimes the court’s precedential case law itself provides percolation, 
with different panels articulating different viewpoints. For instance, before the 
court’s en banc decision in Philips v. AWH Corp.,30 different panels of the court 
adopted different views about the best sources to use in determining the meaning 
of patent claims. Many opinions gave primacy to the patent’s specification and 
  
 27 See, e.g., CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 685 F.3d 1341, 1356 (Fed. Cir.) (Prost, J., 
dissenting), vacated, 484 F. App’x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, 
Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1289, 1312 (Fed. Cir.) (Linn, J., dissenting), vacated, 374 
Fed. App’x. 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010); TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., No. 2009-1374, slip op. at 
15 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 4, 2010) (Rader, J., dissenting), vacated, 376 F. App’x 21 (Fed. Cir. 
2010); Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1380 (Fed. Cir.) (Linn, J., 
concurring), vacated, 595 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Princo Corp. v. ITC, 563 F.3d 
1301, 1321 (Fed. Cir.) (Bryson, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part), 
vacated, 583 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 498 F.3d 
1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir.) (Dyk, J., dissenting), vacated, 256 F. App’x 357 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 28 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 29 See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1373 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 1373 
(O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst 
Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Michel, C.J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 1044 (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en 
banc) (Mayer, J., dissenting); see also Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. 
Am. Corp., 500 F. App’x 951 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (granting petition for rehearing en banc). 
 30 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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prosecution history,31 but others emphasized dictionaries, encyclopedias, and 
treatises as “particularly useful resources.”32 
Congress, too, plays a role in percolating patent law. For example, in the 
lead up to the America Invents Act of 2011,33 members of Congress proposed 
bills to reform Federal Circuit law on issues including damages, venue, and 
willful infringement (which can entitle a patent holder to treble damages).34 
While Congress was weighing those proposals, the Federal Circuit in an en banc 
decision changed its law on willful infringement35 and issued panel decisions 
that increased appellate scrutiny of plaintiffs’ choice of venue36 and of damages 
awards made by juries.37 After the Federal Circuit’s decisions, Congress 
abandoned those reform proposals.38 Thus, as Jonas Anderson has observed, 
Congress can stimulate the evolution of patent law by acting as a “catalyst,” 
identifying problematic areas of Federal Circuit doctrine and encouraging the 
court to make a change.39 
Despite the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction, the current system is 
also capable of identifying for the Supreme Court the patent cases it should 
review, another key benefit of “percolation” according to Judge Wood.40 En 
banc decisions and opinions by Federal Circuit judges dissenting from the denial 
of rehearing en banc provide useful signals to the Court, as do panel dissents, 
  
 31 See id. at 1319. 
 32 E.g., Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). The court in Philips rejected the Texas Digital line of cases, reaffirming the 
primacy of the specification in determining claim meaning. Philips, 415 F.3d at 1321. For 
academic commentary documenting a “distinct split in methodological approach” among 
Federal Circuit judges on the question of claim construction, see R. Polk Wagner & Lee 
Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial 
Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1170 (2004), and R. Polk Wagner & Lee 
Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s 
Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 
123–50 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (updating the original study, with similar 
results). 
 33 America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 34 Gugliuzza, supra note 7, at 1827–28. 
 35 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) 
(overruling case law requiring a patent holder to seek the advice of counsel to avoid a 
finding of willful infringement). 
 36 See, e.g., In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1321–22 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see 
also Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus, 45 IND. L. REV. 381–90 
(2012) (discussing several Federal Circuit venue decisions that followed TS Tech). 
 37 See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 38 Gugliuzza, supra note 7, at 1827–28. 
 39 Jonas Anderson, Congress as a Catalyst of Patent Reform at the Federal Circuit, 
63 AM. U. L. REV. 961, 966–67 (2014). 
 40 Wood, supra note 1, at 4–5. 
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which are quite frequent on the Federal Circuit. An early study showed that 
Federal Circuit judges dissented more often than judges in four out of five 
regional circuits used as a control.41 A more recent study showed that the rate of 
dissent has dramatically increased since 2005, with dissents being filed in 
roughly 25% of precedential patent decisions and only about 60% of 
precedential patent opinions achieving unanimity.42 
In addition, the Solicitor General provides influential advice to the 
Supreme Court about which patent cases warrant review. Professor Duffy has 
shown that, from the 1994 Term through the 2007 Term, the Supreme Court 
followed the Solicitor General’s recommendation to grant or deny certiorari in 
seventeen of the nineteen patent cases (89.5%) in which the Court called for the 
Solicitor General’s views.43 This trend has continued from the 2008 Term 
though the 2012 Term (which concluded in June 2013), with the Court 
following the Solicitor General’s recommendation in eight out of nine cases 
(88.9%).44 
Beyond assisting the Court with case selection, when the Solicitor 
General recommends granting a petition in a patent case, the Solicitor General is 
almost by definition disagreeing with the substance of the doctrine articulated by 
the Federal Circuit. The Supreme Court, for its part, seems inclined to give 
substantial weight to the Solicitor General’s views on the merits, adopting those 
views in the vast majority of recent patent cases in which the Solicitor General 
  
 41 Christopher A. Cotropia, Determining Uniformity Within the Federal Circuit by 
Measuring Dissent and En Banc Review, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 815–18 (2010). 
Professor Cotropia found that dissents were filed in 3.51% of Federal Circuit decisions, 
compared with dissent rates in the regional circuits that ranged from 1.14% to 4.56%. Id. 
at 815. When limited to patent cases, the Federal Circuit’s dissent rate increased to 
9.28%. Id. at 816. 
 42 Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Disuniformity 12–13 (Univ. of Iowa Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 13-42, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2351993. 
Professors Rantanen and Petherbridge hypothesize several potential explanations for the 
increase in dissents, including an influx of new judges on the Federal Circuit and an 
increasing number of Supreme Court patent decisions that are capable of multiple 
interpretations, enhance lower court discretion, or both. See id. at 18–32. 
 43 See John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518, 531 (2010). 
 44 See infra Appendix. The Supreme Court is also aided in selecting patent issues for 
review by amicus briefs filed at the certiorari stage. Professor Chien’s study found that, 
from 2000 to 2009, the Court granted certiorari on forty-five percent of patent petitions 
accompanied by amicus briefs, compared to two percent of patent petitions filed without 
amicus briefs. Chien, supra note 26, at 424. Chien also reports that thirty-one percent of 
patent petitions were accompanied by amicus briefs. Id. 
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has challenged a rule adopted by the Federal Circuit.45 Thus, the Solicitor 
General provides an influential competing perspective on matters of patent law. 
Moreover, the Solicitor General does not act alone when formulating the 
position of the United States. Rather, the Solicitor General mediates the views of 
various federal agencies with relevant expertise, including not just the Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO), but also the Department of Justice (particularly 
the antitrust division), the Federal Trade Commission, and, in appropriate cases, 
organizations such as the National Institutes of Health, the Centers for Disease 
Control, and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.46 In 
fact, on the issue of the patent eligibility of isolated DNA sequences, which was 
recently before the Supreme Court in the Myriad case,47 divergent viewpoints 
had actually emerged from within the executive branch. The PTO had long held 
that isolated sequences of DNA were eligible for patenting,48 but the brief filed 
by the Solicitor General urged the Court to hold that isolated but otherwise 
unmodified DNA was not patent eligible.49 
A Supreme Court reversal of the Federal Circuit, which occurs in about 
seventy percent of the patent cases heard by the Court,50 also percolates patent 
law.51 Not only does the Supreme Court’s decision itself revise the law, the 
decision can trigger additional percolation in the lower courts, the PTO, and the 
International Trade Commission (which has the power to prohibit importation of 
products that infringe U.S. patents).52 Additional percolation is particularly 
  
 45 See Arti K. Rai, Competing with the “Patent Court,” 13 CHI.-KENT. J. INTELL. 
PROP. 386, 390 (2014) (noting that, from 1996 through June 2013, “of the fourteen cases 
in which the executive branch disagreed with the Federal Circuit, the executive branch’s 
position prevailed in all but two”); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Book Review, IP Injury and the 
Institutions of Patent Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 747, 766–67, 770 (citing cases and additional 
sources). 
 46 See Arti K. Rai, Essay, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante 
Foundations for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1240–41 (2012); see also Rai, 
supra note 45, at 390. 
 47 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) 
(Myriad). 
 48 See PTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
 49 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107. 
The Court ultimately sided with the Solicitor General. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2117. 
 50 See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 WISC. L. REV. 11, 40–41. 
 51 For an extended treatment of the Supreme Court’s role in percolating patent 
doctrine, see John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A 
Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657 
(2009). 
 52 On the powers of the Commission, see 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012). 
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likely if the Court, as it has regularly done in recent patent cases, adopts a 
flexible legal standard that will require case-by-case elaboration.53 
The Supreme Court currently performs its percolating role frequently, as 
patent law is now one of the most robust areas of the Court’s docket. The issues 
the Court has considered or is currently considering, like the issues addressed by 
the Federal Circuit en banc, involve fundamental matters of patent doctrine, 
such as patentable subject matter (repeatedly),54 nonobviousness,55 claim 
construction,56 and infringement,57 as well as important issues in patent 
litigation, such as declaratory-judgment standing,58 the burden of proof for 
infringement,59 and remedies for patent holders.60 Also, as this article was going 
to press, the Court decided two cases implicating the high-profile issue of 
“patent litigation abuse.”61 Specifically, the Court ruled that the Federal Circuit 
made it too difficult for prevailing parties in patent litigation to recover their 
attorneys’ fees62 and that the Federal Circuit applied a standard of appellate 
review that did not sufficiently defer to district court decisions to award or deny 
fees.63 
Federal district courts also percolate patent law. Speaking off the bench, 
several district judges have questioned the Federal Circuit’s standards of review 
and proclivity for reversal, particularly with respect to claim construction 
orders.64 Although one might think that, while on the bench, district judges 
would mostly try to avoid appellate reversal, some judges have actually rebelled 
  
 53 On the Supreme Court’s tendency to push for greater flexibility in patent law and 
the “legal uncertainty” that results, see Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)certainty, Legal 
Process, and Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1109, 1133–34 (2010). 
 54 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, No. 13-298, 2014 WL 2765283 (U.S. 2014); 
Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107; Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
1289 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 55 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 56 Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014); Teva Pharms. 
USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 13-854 (U.S. 2014). 
 57 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002); 
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). 
 58 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
 59 Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014); 
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
 60 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 61 The issue of patent litigation abuse is so hot that the President mentioned it in this 
year’s State of the Union address. See President Barack Obama, State of the Union 
Address (Jan. 28, 2014) (calling on Congress to “pass a patent reform bill that allows our 
businesses to stay focused on innovation, not costly, needless litigation”). 
 62 Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014). 
 63 Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014). 
 64 See, e.g., The Honorable Kathleen M. O’Malley et. al., A Panel Discussion: Claim 
Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671 
(2004). 
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against Federal Circuit doctrines that they perceive as inconsistent with Supreme 
Court case law.65 
The Federal Circuit has actually facilitated district court percolation by 
giving those courts leeway to experiment with procedure in patent cases. For 
example, although the Federal Circuit (in a decision affirmed by the Supreme 
Court) held that the critical question of claim construction must be decided by 
the judge, not the jury,66 the Federal Circuit did not impose any requirements 
about when or how that construction must take place. Accordingly, claim 
construction can be (and has been) performed in various ways: at a separate 
hearing, with summary judgment, during discovery, after discovery, and even at 
or after trial in the course of formulating jury instructions.67 Although most 
courts now conduct separate hearings during fact discovery and prior to expert 
discovery, that practice emerged from district court experimentation, not from 
Federal Circuit fiat.68  
Moreover, district courts are experimenting with local procedural rules to 
govern patent cases,69 an experiment that the Federal Circuit facilitates by 
granting appellate deference to district courts’ interpretation and application of 
  
 65 See, e.g., Macronix Int’l Co. v. Spansion Inc., No. 3:13-cv-679, 2014 WL 934505, 
at *5 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2014) (refusing to follow Federal Circuit case law that 
“exempted” patent infringement cases from the pleading standards adopted by the 
Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)); Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Dickinson Wright, P.L.L.C., 666 F. 
Supp. 2d 749, 751–52 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (noting that the Supreme Court has made it 
clear that “there is no ‘single, precise, all-embracing’ test for jurisdiction over federal 
issues embedded in state-law claims” but objecting that “the Federal Circuit appears to 
impose precisely such an all-embracing test, effectively aggregating ever greater swaths 
of state-law claims into its jurisdictional sweep” (citations omitted)), vacated and 
remanded, 631 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011). State judges, too, have sometimes criticized 
or ignored Federal Circuit law. See, e.g., Minton v. Gunn 355 S.W.3d 634, 655 (Tex. 
2011) (Guzman, J., dissenting) (“This Court should not be quick to follow Federal Circuit 
case law that fails to follow the test set forth by the Supreme Court.”); see also 
Gugliuzza, supra note 7, at 1817 nn.133–34 (providing additional examples). 
Opportunities for critique of the Federal Circuit by state judges and regional circuit 
judges might increase now that the Supreme Court has rejected a line of Federal Circuit 
cases that extended exclusive federal district court and Federal Circuit jurisdiction to 
practically all cases raising issues of patent infringement, validity, or enforceability. See 
Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013). 
 66 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), 
aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 67 PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE 5-4 to 5-5 
(2d ed. 2012). 
 68 See id. at 5-5. 
 69 See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 
449, 473–74 (2010). 
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those local rules.70 The Patent Pilot Program created by Congress in 2011 will 
introduce further heterogeneity in patent adjudication as some patent cases in 
some districts will be heard by judges who have volunteered to hear extra patent 
cases while others will not.71  
That said, procedural heterogeneity at the district court level is not the 
sort of direct experimentation with substantive patent doctrine that Judge Wood 
laments is missing under the Federal Circuit. When the Federal Circuit adopts a 
rule of law, that rule governs the entire country (and proceedings at the PTO), no 
matter if a few Federal Circuit judges (and even some rebellious district judges) 
disagree. The oft-praised “laboratories of experimentation,”72 in which judges 
and policymakers can observe the empirical consequences of different legal 
rules, do not emerge, to the possible detriment of patent policy.73  
But one should not overstate the experimentation that would be possible 
within the federal system if multiple courts of appeals heard patent cases. For 
one, even if different courts adopted different rules of patent law, the PTO 
would, as a practical matter, be forced to choose a national rule to govern 
proceedings before the agency. The national rules chosen by the PTO would be 
highly influential because only two percent of patents (at most) are ever 
litigated,74 so few patents would actually be adjudicated under the potentially 
differing laws of the various circuits. The PTO’s role in articulating and 
applying national legal standards for patent validity is already growing because 
of new review procedures created by the America Invents Act,75 and the 
agency’s views would become even more significant under a model in which 
multiple courts were capable of disagreeing. 
  
 70 See Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 289 F.3d 761, 774 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 71 See Pilot Program in Certain District Courts, Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat. 3674 
(2011). 
 72 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 73 For an argument that empirical progress in patent policy depends on greater legal 
diversity, see Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 13–16), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294774. 
 74 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
1495, 1501 (2001). 
 75 America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(a), (d), 125 Stat. 284, 299–311 
(2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). See generally ROBERT P. 
MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 1046–52 
(6th ed. 2013) (describing the PTO’s new post-grant review and inter partes review 
procedures); Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron 
Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1977–78 (2013) (arguing that 
“application of administrative law principles to the new and modified postgrant review 
proceedings triggers Chevron deference for the PTO’s interpretation of ambiguous terms 
of the Patent Act announced during these proceedings”). 
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Alternatively, one might suggest that, even if multiple courts of appeals 
heard appeals in patent litigation, the PTO should simply be bound by the 
Federal Circuit’s case law. (Judge Wood’s proposal does not address the issue of 
choice-of-law at the PTO.) This arrangement, too, would limit experimentation. 
For example, suppose that the Ninth Circuit held that computer software was 
patent eligible, but the Federal Circuit held that it was not. In that scenario, the 
PTO would not issue software patents, so the circuit split would not create much 
experimentation. Conversely, suppose that the Federal Circuit permitted 
software patents but the Ninth Circuit did not. In that instance, it seems 
inefficient for the PTO to permit applicants to obtain patents that will be 
categorically invalidated in litigation in a particular circuit. 
Furthermore, even if different rules of patent law could be successfully 
operationalized in different circuits, the benefits of experimentation would still 
be limited by the difficulty of measuring the impact of different legal rules in 
different geographic areas. Patents are only one of many influences on 
technological innovation. Moreover, because of permissive venue rules, patent 
lawsuits can be filed practically anywhere in the United States, regardless of 
where the underlying technology was developed.76 It would therefore seem 
extremely difficult to determine that a particular circuit sees more technological 
innovation because of a particular legal rule in force within that circuit.77 
Finally, unless the pluralistic model of appellate jurisdiction randomly 
assigned cases to different circuits, it would be improper to label the model a 
true “experiment” because certain litigants would self-select into certain circuits. 
Patent holders in particular would do everything possible to litigate their cases in 
the circuit with the least rigorous standards for patent validity because, under 
federal preclusion doctrine, an invalidity judgment in one case renders the patent 
invalid everywhere and for all time.78 Professors Nard and Duffy’s polycentric 
proposal provides for random assignment of appellate jurisdiction,79 but Judge 
  
 76 See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1453–55 (2010). 
 77 See Ouellette, supra note 73, at 11–13 (discussing the difficulty of attributing 
different levels of innovation in different jurisdictions to those jurisdictions’ varied 
innovation policies). 
 78 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 330–50 
(1971). See generally Alex Kozinski & Daniel Mandell, It’s Blonder-Tongue All Over 
Again, 13 CHI.-KENT. J. INTELL. PROP. 379 (2014). 
 79 Nard & Duffy, supra note 4, at 1668. 
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Wood’s proposal invokes randomization only when both parties appeal and 
cannot agree on a circuit.80 
It might well be that the percolators I have identified, such as Federal 
Circuit judges, Supreme Court justices, federal district judges, and members of 
Congress, are not the ideal percolators of patent law. Most of the Federal 
Circuit’s judges share relatively homogenous backgrounds in patent law or 
international trade, perhaps limiting their sensitivity to broader concerns of 
social policy.81 Supreme Court justices, although perhaps more attuned to 
broader policy concerns, have been said to know little about patent law82 and 
have sometimes resisted engaging the factual and policy complexities that patent 
cases present.83 Opinions by district judges (like dissenting or concurring 
opinions by Federal Circuit judges) have no precedential effect and therefore 
have limited real-world impact. And allowing individual members of Congress 
to catalyze changes in patent law by simply proposing legislation has the 
  
 80 Wood, supra note 1, at 9. For a general argument in favor of randomized case 
allocation among courts with overlapping jurisdiction, see Ori Aronson, Forum by Coin 
Flip: A Random Allocation Model for Jurisdictional Overlap, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 5), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2426134, 
which notes that randomization would “enable comparison, experimentation, and 
learning between forums dealing with similar questions” and would “make[] it more 
difficult for sophisticated parties to plan, prepare, and strategize in order to reach 
sympathetic courts.” 
 81 Of the court’s eleven active judges, four had significant experience in patent law 
before joining the bench (Judges Newman, Lourie, Moore, and Chen) and two had 
significant experience in international trade law (Judges Reyna and Wallach). See Judges, 
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/ 
(last visited Apr. 23, 2014). In addition, Judge O’Malley had substantial experience 
hearing patent cases as a district judge and Judges Dyk and Taranto litigated patent cases 
before their appointments. See id.; see also infra notes 156–60 and accompanying text 
(discussing Judge Taranto’s practice background). 
 82 See Golden, supra note 51, at 688–90. 
 83 For example, in Myriad, Justice Scalia refused to join portions of the Court’s 
opinion providing background facts on genetics and “some portions of the rest of the 
opinion going into fine details of molecular biology,” noting, “I am unable to affirm those 
details on my own knowledge or even my own belief.” 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Also, the five-justice 
majority in Bilski v. Kappos applied several textualist canons of statutory construction, 
including the canon that “words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, 
contemporary, common meaning,” to conclude that a business method could be a patent 
eligible “process” under § 101 of the Patent Act. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226, 3229 (2010). 
Four other justices correctly noted that the majority’s textualism was “a deeply flawed 
approach to a statute that relies on complex terms of art developed against a particular 
historical background.” Id. at 3238 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in the judgment). For an argument that textualism is a tool for 
avoiding complex policy issues, see RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 178–
219 (2013). 
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potential to undermine law’s democratic legitimacy. Still, the current model 
does provide opportunities for divergent viewpoints to emerge and for doctrine 
to be reconsidered and changed over time. Despite the Federal Circuit’s 
exclusive jurisdiction, patent law is percolated. The fundamental problem seems 
to be that the current system simply leads to the wrong outcome too often. 
II. POLICY OBJECTIVES AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
Why do misguided doctrines of patent law emerge? Judge Wood suggests 
that a lack of percolation is the cause.84 However, the policies the Federal Circuit 
was created to pursue also seem to play a role. The Federal Circuit was created 
primarily to generate uniformity in patent law, provide expertise in patent cases, 
and, although not as widely acknowledged in the public discourse, expand the 
scope and strength of patent protection.85 Those policy objectives have shaped 
several important Federal Circuit decisions, particularly those in which the court 
has arguably gotten the law wrong.86  
Uniformity. The overriding publicly stated reason to create the Federal 
Circuit was to provide uniformity in patent law.87 The court’s judges, speaking 
and writing off the bench, have characterized uniformity as a critical “mission” 
  
 84 See Wood, supra note 1, at 4–5. 
 85 For a historical summary of the Federal Circuit’s creation, see Paul R. Gugliuzza, 
Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1453–58 (2012). 
 86 The court’s emphasis on the policies justifying its creation would likely not 
surprise scholars of institutional design, who have theorized that “[p]olicy-oriented 
missions are more likely to develop in courts with a high level of specialization.” 
LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 39 (2012). 
 87 H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 22–23 (1981) (noting that the “central purpose” of the 
Federal Courts Improvement Act, which created the Federal Circuit, was “to reduce the 
widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that exist in the 
administration of patent law”); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s 
Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 1, 1 (2003) (discussing “the court’s Congressional mandate to promote uniformity 
and certainty in patent law”). 
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or “charge” of the Federal Circuit.88 Even the Supreme Court has sometimes 
mentioned uniformity as an important policy goal in the patent field, although 
the Court’s statements on this issue are themselves not particularly uniform.89 
On the bench, the judges of the Federal Circuit have relied on uniformity 
concerns to justify several doctrines of procedure and jurisdiction that are 
inconsistent with well-established federal law. For example, the standards of 
review of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provide the ground rules for 
  
 88 E.g., Judge Richard Linn, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, The 
Changing Landscape of Patent Law at the USPTO, the Supreme Court and the Federal 
Circuit, Address at PatCon 3: The Annual Patent Conference (Apr. 12, 2013), available 
at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8BgC6qXWqo (12:30) (stating that the Federal 
Circuit’s “mission” was to “bring uniformity and regularity to the law of patents”); Judge 
Pauline Newman, After Twenty-Five Years, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 12, 123 (2008) (noting that 
the Federal Circuit’s “charge, the expectation and hope of its creators, was that uniform 
national law, administered by judges who understand the law and its purposes, would 
help to revitalize industrial innovation through a strengthened economic incentive”). See 
generally George C. Beighley, Jr., The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Has It 
Fulfilled Congressional Expectations?, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
671, 699–705 (2011) (various Federal Circuit judges citing uniformity as a 
“congressional expectation” of the Federal Circuit). 
 89 Compare Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) 
(“[W]e see the importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as an 
independent reason to allocate all issues of [claim] construction to the court.”), and 
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162–63 (1989) (holding 
preempted a Florida statute that granted patent-like protection to boat hull designs that 
were not patentable under federal law, noting that “nationwide uniformity in patent law 
. . . [was] frustrated by the Florida scheme”), with Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air 
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 832 (2002) (rejecting the argument that “Congress’s 
goal of promoting the uniformity of patent law” justified permitting patent law 
counterclaims to establish exclusive federal jurisdiction (internal quotation marks 
omitted)), and Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 
U.S. 627, 645 (1999) (rejecting the argument that “[t]he need for uniformity in the 
construction of patent law” justified Congress’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity 
from federal patent infringement suits). 
In previous work, I have distinguished two different dimensions of uniformity: legal 
uniformity, which “reflects the notion that the law governing patent rights should be 
articulated and applied consistently throughout the entire country,” and adjudicative 
uniformity, which “reflects the notions that the claims of a particular patent should be 
construed similarly from one case to another and that courts should not reach inconsistent 
validity findings regarding the same patent.” Gugliuzza, supra note 50, at 21. The 
Supreme Court’s statement in Markman reflects notions of adjudicative uniformity, while 
the statements in Bonito Boats, Holmes Group, and Florida Prepaid reflect notions of 
legal uniformity. Although those distinctions are important in conducting a normative 
assessment of how power over the patent system should be allocated between the state 
and federal governments, see id. at 35–61, the distinctions are less important in this 
paper’s descriptive account of Federal Circuit decisionmaking because the court itself 
does not usually distinguish between the two different types of uniformity. 
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judicial review of federal agency fact-finding,90 but in In re Zurko, the Federal 
Circuit held that the APA did not apply when the court was reviewing fact-
finding by the PTO.91 Instead, the court applied the standard of review normally 
applied by appellate courts reviewing fact-finding by trial judges.92 In adopting 
this unusual rule, the Federal Circuit cited the aim of achieving “consistency” in 
its “review of the patentability decisions of the agency and the district courts in 
infringement litigation.”93 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the APA 
applies to judicial review of the PTO, just like any other agency.94  
Also, the Federal Circuit had held, counter to the well-pleaded complaint 
rule that applies to practically all federal lawsuits, that a patent law counterclaim 
could cause a case to “arise under” patent law and therefore fall within the 
Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction.95 In support of this holding, the court 
emphasized “[t]he broad theme” of the Federal Courts Improvement Act,96 
which created the Federal Circuit: “increasing nationwide uniformity in certain 
fields of national law.”97 The court asserted that “[d]irecting appeals involving 
compulsory counterclaims for patent infringement to the twelve regional circuits 
could frustrate Congress’ desire to foster uniformity.”98 The Supreme Court 
again overturned the Federal Circuit and brought patent law in line with other 
areas of federal law, holding that a federal patent issue must appear in the 
plaintiff’s complaint to create federal jurisdiction.99  
Similarly, in support of its holding that federal courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction over state law claims for legal malpractice against patent attorneys, 
the Federal Circuit cited “‘the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity 
that a federal forum offers.’”100 The Federal Circuit’s rule, however, was 
inconsistent with recent Supreme Court case law, which made clear that for 
federal jurisdiction to exist over a state law claim, there must be a dispute about 
  
 90 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). 
 91 In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 92 See id. 
 93 Id. at 1458. 
 94 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999). 
 95 Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., 895 F.2d 736, 
742 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc). 
 96 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. 
 97 Aerojet, 895 F.2d at 744. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002). The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Holmes Group was, in turn, abrogated by the America 
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(a), 125 Stat. 284, 331 (2011) (codified as amended 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)), which extended exclusive federal jurisdiction to cases in which 
the only patent issue appears in a counterclaim. 
 100 Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 
F.3d 1262, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue 
Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005)). 
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the “validity, construction or effect of [federal] law.”101 According to the Court, 
the “mere need to apply federal law,” as is the case in the vast majority of patent 
malpractice cases, was not sufficient.102 Yet again, the Supreme Court 
overturned the Federal Circuit’s rule.103 
The policy of uniformity has also influenced the Federal Circuit’s 
decision to review de novo district court claim construction, a doctrine that has 
been widely criticized as inefficient because of the factual determinations claim 
construction requires and the inherent indeterminacy of the language of patent 
claims.104 In the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS 
Technologies, Inc., the court emphasized that its “role in providing national 
uniformity to the construction of a patent claim . . . would be impeded if [it] 
were bound to give deference to a trial judge’s asserted factual determinations 
incident to claim construction.”105 And the court’s recent decision reaffirming de 
novo review was based largely on the rationale that “plenary review of claim 
construction . . . provid[es] national uniformity, consistency, and finality to the 
meaning and scope of patent claims.”106  
At this point, it is worth pausing to identify a paradox in the Federal 
Circuit’s treatment of the policy of uniformity. As I have shown, the court’s 
judges have mentioned that policy in numerous opinions that have been 
overturned by the Supreme Court, have been criticized by judges and scholars, 
or both. Yet for all of the Federal Circuit’s expressed concern about uniformity, 
the court’s judges still take the “percolating” actions I identified in the first part 
of this paper: they convene en banc frequently, they regularly dissent, and, 
recently, they have issued deeply divided decisions that have practically 
required the Supreme Court to intervene to make a definitive statement of the 
  
 101 Grable, 545 U.S. at 313 (quoting Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561 (1912)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1068 (2013). 
 104 See Gugliuzza, supra note 7, at 1833 n.220 (collecting commentary criticizing de 
novo review). 
 105 138 F.3d 1448, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 106 Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1277 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
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law.107 As Chief Justice Roberts observed during a recent oral argument in a 
patent case: “the Federal Circuit was established to bring about uniformity in 
patent law, but [the court’s judges] seem to have a great deal of disagreement 
among themselves.”108  
Why the inconsistency between the court’s words and its actions? Any 
answer is inevitably speculative, but I will offer some tentative thoughts. First, 
there is the elementary legal realist point that the stated policy of uniformity is 
not the actual motivator for the court’s decisions. As I have noted in prior work, 
many of the decisions that cite uniformity also expand the Federal Circuit’s 
power over the patent system, which in turn arguably enhances the prestige of 
the court and its esteem within the patent bar.109 Uniformity, then, might simply 
be a justification for pursuing those underlying aims. Alternatively, the court’s 
judges simply may not see the disconnect between the text of their opinions 
praising uniformity and their actions undercutting it. In any case, the salient 
point for present purposes is descriptive: the patent system currently has 
percolation precisely because it does not have the uniformity that the Federal 
Circuit often lauds. 
As a concluding example of how uniformity concerns shape Federal 
Circuit doctrine, consider the Federal Circuit opinions in Highmark Inc. v. 
Allcare Management Systems, Inc., the case in which Chief Justice Roberts 
made his quip about uniformity. Under the Federal Circuit case law in effect at 
the time, a prevailing defendant in a patent case could recover attorneys’ fees 
only if the plaintiff filed its lawsuit in “subjective bad faith” and the lawsuit was 
  
 107 See, for example, CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir.) 
(en banc), aff’d, No. 13-298, 2014 WL 2765283 (U.S. 2014), which presented a question 
about the patent eligibility of a claimed invention in computer software. As to two of the 
three categories of patent claims presented, the court divided five-to-five on whether the 
claims satisfied the patentable subject matter requirement of § 101 of the Patent Act. Id. 
As to the final category of claims, a majority of the court’s judges voted to affirm the 
district court’s judgment of invalidity, but the court issued no majority opinion. Id.; see 
also Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 701 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(seven-to-five decision denying rehearing en banc on an issue related to shifting 
attorneys’ fees), vacated and remanded, 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. 
Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (six-to-five decision 
on induced infringement), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). 
 108 Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014) (No. 12-1163). 
 109 Gugliuzza, supra note 7, at 1798, 1858. 
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“objectively baseless.”110 The content and application of the standard for 
awarding attorneys’ fees is a significant issue because some commentators view 
fee shifting as an effective tool to deter and punish “abusive” patent lawsuits.111 
In Highmark, the issue was the appropriate standard of review for a district 
court’s ruling on objective baselessness.112 The Federal Circuit panel applied a 
de novo standard.113 In a concurrence issued with the denial of rehearing en 
banc, Judge Dyk (author of the panel opinion) defended de novo review, stating 
that it “assures uniformity in the treatment of patent litigation, insofar as 
reasonableness is the governing issue.”114 Dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing en banc, Judge Moore took a different view of how de novo review 
would affect uniformity, stating: “When we convert factual issues, or mixed 
questions of law and fact, into legal ones for our de novo review, we undermine 
the uniformity and predictability goals this court was designed to advance.”115 
These dueling statements highlight the importance of uniformity in judicial 
decisionmaking on the most important legal issues facing the patent system 
today. Accordingly, in searching for causes of problems in patent law, we 
should consider not only a lack of percolation but also the influence of the 
policies the Federal Circuit was created to pursue. 
Expertise. Another prominent reason for the Federal Circuit’s creation 
was that the court would provide “expertise in highly specialized and technical 
areas,” such as patent law.116 The objective of providing expertise also shapes 
Federal Circuit doctrine. For example, in Highmark, Judge Dyk defended de 
novo review of objective baselessness because “[t]he Federal Circuit brings to 
the table useful expertise.”117 “Our court,” he reasoned, “sees far more patent 
  
 110 Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). The power to award attorneys’ fees derives from 35 U.S.C. § 285, which provides 
that “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing party.” The Supreme Court recently overturned the two-element test of Brooks 
Furniture in Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 
(2014) (holding that “an ‘exceptional’ case is simply one that stands out from others with 
respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both the 
governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case 
was litigated”). 
 111 See Letter from Intellectual Property Law Professors to Members of the U.S. 
Congress in Support of Patent Reform Litigation 3 (Nov. 25, 2013), available at 
http://www.patentlyo.com/media/2014/02/professorsletterontrolls.pdf. 
 112 See Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300, 1308–10 
(Fed. Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded, 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014). 
 113 Id. at 1309. 
 114 Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 701 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (Dyk, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 115 Id. at 1362 (Moore, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).  
 116 S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6 (1981). 
 117 Highmark, 701 F.3d at 1356 (Dyk, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
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cases than any district court, and is well positioned to recognize those 
‘exceptional’ cases in which a litigant could not, under the law, have had a 
reasonable expectation of success.”118 
Judge Dyk’s explicit appeal to expertise is somewhat unusual, as the 
court’s opinions mention expertise less frequently than the policy of 
uniformity.119 My prior work has shown, however, that the Federal Circuit, as it 
did by embracing de novo review in Highmark, has developed many legal 
doctrines that exclude other institutions from shaping patent doctrine and 
adjudicating the facts of patent cases.120 These doctrines bolster the Federal 
Circuit’s position as the expert patent institution, to the exclusion of other 
institutions that might bring useful expertise to bear on patent law and patent 
disputes. For example, in the field of administrative law, the court has limited 
both the fact-finding and lawmaking power of the PTO, an institution that 
possesses substantial patent expertise.121 Also, the court has refused to give 
Chevron or Skidmore deference to the decisions of the International Trade 
Commission on patent validity, enforceability, or infringement,122 even though 
the Commission’s administrative law judges are experienced patent 
adjudicators.123 Finally, the Federal Circuit’s affinity for de novo appellate 
review of district court rulings on matters such as claim construction, attorneys’ 
fees, and willful infringement124 displaces trial court authority to definitively 
resolve both factual and legal issues in patent cases. The court’s searching 
appellate review can be a poor use of judicial resources, particularly on fact-
  
 118 Id. 
 119 Interestingly, other courts have mentioned the Federal Circuit’s expertise in patent 
law to justify questionable Federal Circuit doctrines. See, e.g., Byrne v. Wood, Herron & 
Evans, LLP, 676 F.3d 1024, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (O’Malley, J., dissenting from the 
denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that other courts’ decisions following Federal Circuit 
case law sometimes “reflect the deference other courts give to the Federal Circuit on 
patent law issues based on our unique appellate jurisdiction” but that “in many instances, 
[the decisions] . . . us[e] our experience in patent matters as a facile way to explain away 
circuit case law that is inconsistent with applicable, governing standards”). 
 120 See Gugliuzza, supra note 7. 
 121 See id. at 1820–23.  
 122 Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1568 
n.112 (2011).  
 123 David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim 
Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the 
International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1702–03 (2009). 
 124 Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 682 F.3d 1003, 1006–07 
(Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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driven questions.125 More to the point, the Federal Circuit’s exclusion of other 
institutions from influencing the patent system is consistent with a judicial 
objective to offer the court’s expertise on as many matters of patent law as is 
possible. 
Expanding and Strengthening Patent Protection. Many of the Federal 
Circuit’s supporters also hoped that the court would expand the scope of patent 
protection and strengthen patent rights.126 In the Federal Circuit’s very first 
decision, the court embraced a relatively lenient standard of patentability by 
adopting the precedent of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), 
rather than starting anew with both CCPA and regional circuit decisions 
providing persuasive authority.127 Several analyses have concluded that courts 
invalidate patents less frequently now than before Congress created the Federal 
Circuit.128 Indeed, the judges of the Federal Circuit have boasted that their court 
has “strengthened the patent system”129 and have warned against allowing 
changes in the court’s personnel and in patent doctrine to “undermine or weaken 
the patent system.”130  
  
 125 See Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300, 1319–20 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (Mayer, J., dissenting in part) (“The fact that we have been vested with 
exclusive appellate jurisdiction in patent cases does not . . . grant us license to invade the 
fact-finding province of the trial courts. As a result of [our] appellate overreaching, 
litigation before the district court has become a mere dress rehearsal for the command 
performance here. Encouraging relitigation of factual disputes on appeal . . . vitiates the 
critically important fact-finding role of the district courts.”) (citations omitted), vacated 
and remanded, 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014). 
 126 See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR 
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO 
DO ABOUT IT 10 (2004). 
 127 South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc); see 
Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law: The Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals and the Shape of the Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843, 
869 (2010) (noting that, after South Corp., any regional circuit precedents that conflicted 
with CCPA precedents were “discarded without ceremony or consideration”); see also 
BAUM, supra note 86, at 183 (noting that the choice to adopt CCPA case law “favored a 
lenient standard of patentability”). Before the Federal Circuit was created, the CCPA had 
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from proceedings at the PTO. Appeals in patent 
litigation before the district courts were heard by the regional circuits. 
 128 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 348 (2003); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, 
Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 251 (1998); 
Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s 
Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 114 (2006); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., 
Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 1, 15–16 (2004). 
 129 E.g., Beighley, supra note 88, at 729 (quoting Judge Rader). 
 130 Linn, supra note 88, at 37:00. 
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Several of the Federal Circuit’s most significant doctrines are consistent 
with an objective to broaden and strengthen patent rights. For example, under a 
long line of Federal Circuit decisions, a party asserting that a claimed invention 
was obvious based on a combination of existing technology had to identify a 
specific “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” to combine those prior art 
references.131 This so-called TSM test placed an onerous burden on a party 
challenging validity, and, in 2007, the Supreme Court abrogated the Federal 
Circuit’s test, adopting a more flexible standard, which acknowledges that 
market demands and common sense might also make a claimed invention 
obvious.132 In addition, the Federal Circuit had embraced a broad conception of 
the types of inventions eligible for patenting under § 101 of the Patent Act, 
including business methods and human gene sequences. The Supreme Court, 
however, appears to view the Federal Circuit’s patent-eligibility criteria as too 
broad, reversing recent decisions that held isolated human DNA and certain 
methods of medical diagnosis to be patent eligible.133 
The Federal Circuit has not only embraced doctrines that would make it 
easier to uphold the validity of a patent, the court has also issued decisions 
tilting the litigation process in favor of patent holders in important ways. For 
example, the court adopted a presumption that a patent holder who established 
infringement was entitled to an injunction against future infringement.134 The 
Supreme Court rejected that presumption, holding that the usual equitable test 
for an injunction applies in patent cases.135 Also, the Federal Circuit had 
disincentivized patent licensees from filing declaratory judgment suits 
challenging the patent’s validity, requiring that licensees first breach the license 
agreement, exposing themselves to claims for damages.136 Again the Supreme 
Court overturned that rule, holding that a licensee in good standing could file 
suit if, generally speaking, there was a realistic threat of suit if the licensee did 
not pay royalties.137 
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that the Federal Circuit invariably 
acts to strengthen patent rights. Empirical evidence suggests that although the 
  
 131 See, e.g., Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 132 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418–19 (2007). 
 133 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 
(2013) (isolated DNA); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
1289, 1298 (2012) (method for determining safety and efficacy of drug dosage levels). 
 134 See, e.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 135 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–92 (2006). 
 136 Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 137 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007). More recently, the 
Supreme Court overturned a Federal Circuit decision that placed the burden of proving 
non-infringement on the potential infringer who had filed a declaratory judgment action. 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 846 (2014). The 
Court instead held that the burden should be on the patent holder, just as it would be in a 
coercive suit for infringement. Id. 
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Federal Circuit has made it easier to uphold validity as compared to the regional 
circuits before it, it has not made it easier for patent holders to prove 
infringement.138 Indeed, Kimberly Moore has shown that most Federal Circuit 
decisions on the often-dispositive issue of claim construction favor the accused 
infringer, not the patent holder.139 Moreover, the Federal Circuit has begun to 
heavily scrutinize large jury verdicts in favor of patent holders.140  
Thus, rather than characterizing the court as single-mindedly “pro-
patent,” one might rely on the court’s tendencies on validity and infringement to 
tell a more nuanced story about capture. High rates of patent validity, combined 
with infringement outcomes that unduly favor neither patent holders nor accused 
infringers, are arguably the outcomes that patent lawyers would most prefer: 
such a regime would, in general, encourage companies to actively obtain patents 
(because they will mostly be ruled valid) and encourage both plaintiffs and 
defendants to vigorously litigate infringement disputes (because both parties will 
have a reasonable chance of prevailing). Indeed, recent evidence suggests that 
the increase in the rate of patent validity shortly after the Federal Circuit was 
created coincided with a surge in patenting and patent litigation.141 Moreover, 
although the rate of patent infringement dropped beginning in 1990, the amount 
of patent litigation has continued to grow.142 Thus, rather than simply 
  
 138 See Henry & Turner, supra note 128, at 114. 
 139 Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More 
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 241 (2005) (reporting that, from 1996 
through 2003, Federal Circuit claim constructions, which the court conducts de novo, 
favored the accused infringer fifty-eight percent of the time). Of course, there may be 
some selection effects in that losing patent holders are particularly likely to press weak 
appeals due to the preclusive effects of an adverse judgment. See supra note 78 and 
accompanying text. 
 140 See J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1085 (2014) 
(describing the Federal Circuit’s “shift towards a more aggressive supervisory role in 
damages jurisprudence”). 
 141 See Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, Across Five Eras: Patent Enforcement in 
the United States 1929-2006 23 (June 4, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2274383.  
 142 Id. 
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characterizing the Federal Circuit as “pro-patent,” it might be more accurate to 
characterize the court as “pro-patent lawyer.”143 
III. SAVING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
Modern patent law has its problems. The Federal Circuit may have 
pushed doctrine too far in favor of patent holders and may be too solicitous of 
the patent bar. By excluding other institutions from shaping patent law, the court 
maintains its “expert” status but weakens other institutions, such as the PTO and 
the International Trade Commission, which could beneficially shape patent law. 
And, in the service of uniformity, the Federal Circuit has adopted procedural and 
jurisdictional rules at odds with long-standing Supreme Court doctrine. Judge 
Wood diagnoses patent law’s problems as stemming from insufficient 
percolation; I have suggested that the policy objectives that animated the 
creation of the Federal Circuit also play a role. Can institutional reform help 
mitigate the distorting effect of those policies? 
Perhaps. In the most extreme reform possibility (which Judge Wood does 
not endorse), patent appeals would be heard only by the twelve regional 
circuits.144 In that regime, one might still see references to uniformity in 
appellate patent decisions, as uniformity is thought to be beneficial in most areas 
of the law.145 But there would be no national policy of providing substantive 
appellate expertise, and any inclination to strengthen patent rights would also 
likely disappear.146  
It is less clear how proposals such as Judge Wood’s, which save the 
Federal Circuit but abolish its exclusive jurisdiction, would impact the weight 
given by courts to objectives such as uniformity and expertise. On one hand, 
appeals in patent litigation would no longer be centralized in an expert court 
capable of providing uniformity, which would likely reduce the salience of 
arguments that appeal to the policies of uniformity and expertise. On the other 
  
 143 For an interesting analysis of how the labor market for patent professionals is 
shaped by the increasing number of patents and patent lawsuits, see John M. Golden, 
Proliferating Patents and Patent Law’s “Cost Disease,” 51 HOUS. L. REV. 455, 476–89 
(2013), which observes that “as the numbers of patent applications, patents and resultant 
clearance questions, licensing negotiations, or lawsuits increase, the system’s demands on 
a relatively scarce supply of people with appropriate scientific, technological, or legal 
backgrounds increase,” “impos[ing] a sort of ‘diversion of labor’ cost on the economy, 
pulling skilled labor away from economic sectors with greater opportunities for growth in 
productivity.” 
 144 For a proposal along these lines, see Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Rethinking Federal 
Circuit Jurisdiction—A Short Comment, 100 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 23, 24 (2012). 
 145 For a challenge to this conventional view, see Amanda Frost, Overvaluing 
Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567 (2008).  
 146 In fact, the court’s abolition might be interpreted by the regional circuits as a 
message to weaken patents, a policy that in the long run could cause its own problems.  
 
No. 2] Saving the Federal Circuit 375 
 
 
 
 
hand, the salience of those arguments would not be completely eliminated 
because the expert Federal Circuit would continue to exist. Indeed, Judge Wood 
herself contemplates that, under her proposal, “the Federal Circuit would still 
play a leading role in shaping patent law.”147 Other appellate courts hearing 
patent cases might then simply defer to Federal Circuit law, which has already 
been (and might continue to be) distorted by considerations of uniformity and 
expertise.148 Further, if the Federal Circuit were to continue to have exclusive 
jurisdiction over PTO appeals (Judge Wood does not address this issue in her 
speech), other appellate courts deciding patent cases might interpret that 
structure as continued evidence of a national policy of patent law uniformity. 
Thus, to ensure that Judge Wood’s proposal actually introduces heterogeneity 
into patent law, the proposal would have to clearly instruct the regional circuits 
not to defer to Federal Circuit precedent.149  
But there may be ways to reduce the pull of the Federal Circuit’s policy 
objectives that are both less drastic than abolishing the court’s exclusive 
jurisdiction and more realistic because they require no action by Congress.150 For 
example, the President might seek to appoint judges who have some experience 
in patent law but who also have a range of experience in other areas. This 
  
 147 Wood, supra note 1, at 10. 
 148 It is already somewhat commonplace for courts—even peer-level federal appellate 
courts—to defer to the Federal Circuit on matters related to patent law. See, e.g., USPPS, 
Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 647 F.3d 274, 281–82 (5th Cir. 2011) (following Federal 
Circuit jurisdictional law that was in tension with a prior decision of the Fifth Circuit, 
noting that “[o]ur decision is guided by . . . the strong federal interest in the removal [of] 
non-uniformity in the patent law” (second alteration in original, internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Schinzing v. Mid-States Stainless, Inc., 415 F.3d 807, 811 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(“adopt[ing] the Federal Circuit’s precedent on substantive issues of patent law”); see 
also Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, 676 F.3d 1024, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (noting “the deference other 
courts give to the Federal Circuit on patent law issues based on our unique appellate 
jurisdiction”). Remarkably, in a recent Supreme Court argument, Chief Justice Roberts 
asked whether the Supreme Court might “give some deference to” a decision of the 
Federal Circuit, given that the court “was set up to develop patent law in a uniform way.” 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (No. 12-1184).  
 149 Rochelle Dreyfuss, in her contribution to this symposium, makes a similar point, 
noting that for Judge Wood’s proposal “[t]o improve [the] quality [of patent law], the 
regional circuits would have to refrain from following Federal Circuit precedent in cases 
of national importance.” Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Abolishing Exclusive Jurisdiction in the 
Federal Circuit: A Response to Judge Wood, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 327, 344 
(2014). 
 150 On whether Judge Wood’s proposal to abolish the Federal Circuit’s exclusive 
jurisdiction is politically feasible, see Rai, supra note 45, at 387, which notes that 
“[c]onsiderations of political economy are not on Judge Wood’s side.” 
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broader experience might make those judges hesitant to rely on patent-specific 
policy objectives to justify a decision in tension with broader legal principles. 
There is evidence that a generalist judge with significant knowledge of 
patent law can be a good steward of the patent system. The most “generalist” 
judge currently on the Federal Circuit is Judge Kathleen O’Malley, who was 
appointed in 2010 after sixteen years as a district judge in the Northern District 
of Ohio. Judge O’Malley was the first-ever district judge appointed to the 
Federal Circuit, and in her short time on the bench, she has taken strong 
positions against some of the Federal Circuit doctrines I have identified as 
connected to the court’s foundational policy objectives. For example, she wrote 
several opinions questioning the Federal Circuit’s expansive approach to 
exclusive federal jurisdiction over state-law claims,151 and her position was 
vindicated by the Supreme Court in Gunn v. Minton.152 She also wrote an 
opinion arguing that the Federal Circuit should revisit its rule that claim 
construction is reviewed de novo on appeal,153 as well as the dissent in the recent 
en banc case in which the court reaffirmed the de novo standard.154 Judge 
O’Malley’s position might again be vindicated, as the Supreme Court has 
recently agreed to decide the appropriate standard of review for claim 
construction.155 
Judge Richard Taranto, another recent appointee, may also turn out to be 
a commendable example of a generalist judge with significant knowledge of 
patent law. Judge Taranto’s law practice focused on appellate litigation, and, 
although he argued several significant patent cases before the Supreme Court156 
and the Federal Circuit,157 he also argued Supreme Court cases on issues of 
  
 151 See Minkin v. Gibbons, P.C., 680 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (O’Malley, J., 
concurring); Memorylink Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 676 F.3d 1051, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Landmark Screens, LLC v. 
Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius, LLP, 676 F.3d 1354, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (O’Malley, 
J., concurring); USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 676 F.3d 1341, 1350 (O’Malley, 
J., concurring), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 1794 (2013); Byrne, 676 F.3d at 1027 
(O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Byrne v. Wood, Herron & 
Evans, LLP, 450 F. App’x 956, 960–61 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (authoring majority opinion that 
followed but questioned Federal Circuit precedent), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 
1454 (2013). 
 152 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013). 
 153 Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).  
 154 Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1296 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (O’Malley, J., dissenting). 
 155 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 13-854 (U.S. 2014). 
 156 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 157 E.g., Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 670 F.3d 1171 
(Fed. Cir. 2012); Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2011); Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell Inc., 238 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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antitrust law,158 copyright law,159 and trade dress law,160 and he spent three years 
in the Office of the Solicitor General. Thus, Judge Taranto might also be poised 
to temper the influences of the Federal Circuit’s foundational policy objectives 
on the court’s case law. 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of Judge Wood’s speech is her 
evident enthusiasm for hearing patent cases.161 She makes clear that, contrary to 
the conventional wisdom, some judges relish the challenge of a patent dispute. 
Yet many regional circuit judges will never hear a patent case.162 Thirty years 
ago, when patent law was viewed as a specialized, esoteric area of law, 
removing patent appeals from the judicial mainstream might not have been a 
major concern for public policy. But patent law is far more visible and important 
today, and it is unfortunate that some of our most accomplished federal judges, 
such as Judge Wood, have practically no say in the development of patent 
doctrine. That may, in fact, be the best reason for abolishing the Federal 
Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals. 
 
  
 158 Verizon Communc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 
(2004). 
 159 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 160 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
 161 See Wood, supra note 1, at 10 (“Speaking personally, I would welcome the re-
integration of intellectual property law in the regional circuits.”). 
 162 A few regional circuit judges have recently presided over patent cases at the trial 
level. See, e.g., Vederi, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-07747, 2012 WL 4511424 
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2012) (Kozinski, C.J., sitting by designation), vacated and 
remanded, 744 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 
901 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (Posner, J., sitting by designation), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
vacated in part, and remanded, Nos. 2012-1548, 2012-1549, 2014 WL 1646435 (Fed. 
Cir. Apr. 25, 2014). Regional circuit judges have also occasionally sat by designation on 
the Federal Circuit, but that last occurred in 2009. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT VISITING JUDGES, available at 
http://cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/judicial-reports/vjchartforwebsite2006-2013.pdf 
(last visited July 8, 2014). 
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* This list is current through July 8, 2014. 
Case 
Term Order 
Issued 
SG Cert. 
Recommendation 
Cert. 
Decision 
Bd. of Trustees of Leland 
Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche 
Molecular Sys., Inc. 
2009 Grant Granted 
Applera Corp. v. Enzo Biochem, 
Inc. 
2010 Deny Denied 
Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. 
Novo Nordisk A/S 
2010 Grant Granted 
Saint-Gobain Ceramics & 
Plastics, Inc. v. Siemens Med. 
Solutions USA, Inc, 
2011 Deny Denied 
Bowman v. Monsanto Co. 2011 Deny Granted 
GlaxoSmithKline v. Classen 
Immunotherapies, Inc. 
2011 Deny Denied 
Retractable Techs., Inc. v. 
Becton, Dickinson & Co. 
2011 Deny Denied 
Sony Computer Entm’t Am. 
LLC v. 1st Media, LLC 
2012 Deny Denied 
Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight 
Networks, Inc. 
2012 Grant Granted 
Maersk Drilling USA, Inc. v. 
Transocean Offshore Deepwater 
Drilling 
2013 Not filed 
Dismissed 
Due to 
Settlement 
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco 
Sys., Inc. 
2013 Not yet filed  
